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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
C HARLES KERMIT LESLEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18038 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Charles Kermit Lesley, was charged with 
Production of a Controlled Substance (to wit, cultivation of 
marijuana), a felony, under Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-8 (1) 
(a)(i) (1953), as amended; and with Criminal Trespass, a class 
C misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-206 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of both charges after a 
jury trial on August 13 and 17, 1981 in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, presiding. On September 23, 
1981, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment at the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not exceeding five 
years and fined $900.00 for the felony offense; and was 
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sentenced to imprisonment at the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term not exceeding 90 days and fined $299.00 for 
the misdemeanor offense--the sentences to run concurrently. A 
stay of execution of the above sentence was granted and 
appellant was placed on conditional probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Red Butte Canyon, located in Salt Lake County a 
short distance due east of the University of Utah, is a rugged 
area charactrized by steep terrain, dense brush, and a large 
population of rattlesnakes (T. 5, 7, 8). On August 21, 1980, 
it was a no-trespass, entry-by-permission-onlyl area 
controlled by the United States Forest Service (U.S.F.S.). A 
single road with three locked gates, the first of which 
displayed no-trespassing siqns, provided the only access for 
vehicles into the canyon. There were no designated trails for 
public use in the area, and people were not commonly seen 
there (T. 6, 13, 14, 15, 16). 
lAccess to Red Butte Canyon was limited to 
u.S.F.S. personnel, persons with permission from the Forest 
service (generally, these persons were research workers from 
the university of Utah), and 100 deer hunters in October {T. 
6 ) • 
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On that same date, Steve Alexander, a Salt Lake 
County deputy sheriff, entered Red Butte Canyon with 
approximately ten other officers and Gene Lowin, a forest 
technician who had been permanently employed by the U.S.F.S. 
for three years and was familiar with the canyon and its use. 
Their purpose was to seize marijuana plants and i terns related 
to its cultivation in a "farm" compound which had been 
detected in the area and investigated at an earlier date (T. 
4, 9, 26, 27). At a distance of approximately one-quarter 
mile, Officer Alexander observed appellant walking in the 
immediate area of the compound. Shortly thereafter, Alexander 
arrived at the compound and found appellant nearby (T. 29, 30) 
(no other individuals were found {T. 12, 57)). After asking 
appellant for some identification and to explain his presence 
in the area, and having been informed by Gene Lowin that 
appellant was trespassing, Officer Alexander placed appellant 
under arrest (T. 53).2 Several items of evidence were 
seized during a search of appellant and his pack conducted 
pursuant to the arrest ( T. 31-45). 
On February 6, 1981, appellant filed a pre-trial 
motion in the district court, Judge Jay Banks, presiding, to 
2rt should be noted that Alexander's testimony at 
trial indicated that he didn't recall exactly whether, before 
he arrested appellant, he had asked for identification and an 
explanation of appellant's presence in the area. However, his 
testimony did indicate that he had been informed by Lowin of 
appellant's trespasser status before the arrest was made (T. 
31, 53). 
-3-
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suppress the evidence seized from his pack. His memorandum in 
support of that motion asserted that Officer Alexander did not 
have probable cause to arrest him, and thus the evidence 
seized should not be admissible at trial (R. 12-18). The 
district court denied the motion. During his trial on August 
14 and 17, 1981, at which Judge Peter Leary presided, 
appellant raised no objection to the admission of that 
evidence or of any other evidence offered by the prosecution 
(T. 88, 100). The jury found him guilty of both criminal 
trespass and production of a controlled substance (R. 41, 42). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
A. BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO OBJECT AT 
TRIAL TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE 
NOW CHALLENGED ON APPEAL, HE IS 
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE ON 
APPEAL. 
Although appellant filed a pre-trial motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his pack pursuant to a 
search conducted after his arrest, the admission of which he 
now challenges on appeal, he failed to raise an objection at 
trial; thus, the issue was not preserved for consideration on 
appeal. In fact, the record indicates that appellant 
-4-
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consented to admission of the evidence. At T. 88, the 
following dialogue appears: 
Mr. Christensen (Prosecutor): At this 
time, your Honor, I believe that Mr. Long 
has had a chance to review the exhibits 
and I would offer Exhibits 1-P through and 
i nc 1 u a i ng 3 5- p • 3 
The Court: Have you examined the 
photographs? 
Mr. Long (Appellant's attorney): I have, 
your Honor. I have no objection to the 
introduction of them in evidence. 
The Court: Exhibits 1 through 35 will be 
admitted. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of 
the erroneous admission of evidence unless 
(a) there appears of record objection to 
the evidence timely interposed and so 
stated as to make clear the specific 
ground of objection, and (b) the court 
which passes upon the effect of the error 
or errors is of the opinion that the 
admitted evidence should have been 
excluded on the ground stated anq probably 
had a substantial influence in bringing 
about the verdict or finding. However, 
the court in its discretion, and in the 
interests of justice, may review the 
erroneous admission of evidence even 
though the grounds of the objection 
thereto are not correctly stated. 
3Exhibits 1-P through 35-P included the evidence 
seized from appellant's pack. 
-5-
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Recently, in State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 
(1982), this Court made clear what effect a defendant's 
failure to comply with the "contemporaneous objection" 
requirements of Rule 4 would have on assignments of error made 
on appeal. In holding that McCardell's failure to interpose a 
timely and specific objection to the admission of several "mug 
shots" precluded consideration on appeal of his arguments 
respecting that issue (even though his "arguments on [that] 
point clearly ha[d] merit," 652 P.2d at 946), the Court said: 
We endorse the following statement made by 
the Kansas Supreme Court in [State v. 
Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923 (1975)]: 
"The contemporaneous objection rule long 
adhered to in this state requires timely 
and specific objection to admission of 
evidence in order for the question of 
admissibility to be considered on appeal. 
The rule is a salutory procedural tool 
serving a legitimate state purpose. By 
making use of the rule, counsel gives the 
trial court the opportunity to conduct the 
trial without using the tainted evidence, 
and thus avoid possible reversal and a new 
trial. Furthermore, the rule is 
practically one of necessity if litigation 
is ever to be brought to an end." 
543 P.2d at 927, quoting Baker v. State, 
204 Kan. 607, 611, 464 P.2d 212, 216 
(1970). 
652 P.2d at 947. See also: State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 
401 P.2d 445 (1965). The same considerations apply here. 
Thus, appellant's failure to interpose any objection, which 
thereby denied the trial court an opportunity to address his 
-6-
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concerns, should have the same consequences such inexcusable 
procedural default had in State v. Mccardell, supra--a refusal 
by this Court to consider the evidence issue on appeal. As 
Justice Powell stated in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976), 
[T] here are two situations in which a 
conviction should be left standing despite 
the claimed infringement of a 
constitutional right. The first situation 
arises when it can be shown that the 
substantive right in question was 
consensually relinquished. The other 
situation arises when a defendant has made 
an "inexcusable procedural default" in 
failing to object at a time when a 
substantive right could have been 
protected. 
Id. at 513-514 {concurring opinion) (emphasis added). 
A further issue must also be addressed. Utah Code 
Ann., § 77-35-12 (1980) provides for the filing of pre-trial 
motions to suppress evidence, like that which was filed in 
appellant's case. There is a split of authority concerning 
the issue of whether a defendant whose pre-trial motion to 
suppress has been denied must again raise an objection to the 
evidence at trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal. 
However, given the policy considerations expressed by this 
Court in State v. Mccardell, supra, and State v. Smith, supra, 
the following rule as stated by the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals in Romo v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 577 S.W.2d 251 {1978) 
-7-
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is most consistent with those considerations and should be 
adopted in Utah: 
[R]eliance on a motion in limine will not 
preserve error. A defendant must object 
on the proper grounds when the evidence is 
offered at trial. Harrington v. State, 
547 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). The 
reason for this rule is that a judge is 
often not in a position to necide on the 
admissibility of evidence prior to the 
beginning of trial. This is particularly 
true when the objection is based on 
grounds such as the failure to prove a 
proper predicate. Counsel could ask in 
the motion in limine that before a suspect 
area is entered into at trial, the 
opposing counsel be required to approach 
the bench.and inform the court so that the 
jury may be excluded. By that procedure 
the evidence may be challenged at the 
proper time without risk of prejudicing 
the jury. Whatever the procedure chosen, 
defense counsel must object before the 
evidence is admitted during trial in order 
to properly call the court's attention to 
the matter and preserve the error for 
appeal. 
577 S.W.3d at 252. See also: State v. Hinsey, Iowa, 200 
N.W.2d 810 (1972); Jackson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 529, 133 
S.E.2d 436 (1963). However, cf. United States v. Hopkins, 433 
F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1970) and Sacramento and San Joaquin 
Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847 
{1963), which are contra. 
The above rule is particularly applicable where, as 
here, the judge ruling on the pre-trial motion to suppress is 
not the same judge who presides at trial. By failing to 
-8-
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object, appellant denied the trial judge an opportunity to 
consider appellant's arguments against admission of the 
evidence; and, in fact, gave the trial judge the impression 
that he consented to its admission after being specifically 
asked if he had any objections (T. 88). Given these facts, 
appellant has absolutely no grounds to appeal. 
B. OFFICER ALEXANDER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO ARREST APPELLANT; THUS, THE 
EVIDENCE SEIZED WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED 
AT TRIAL. 
Even if this Court decides to consider the evidence 
issue, appellant's assignment of error is without merit. 
Appellant argues that unner the circumstances of his case, his 
arrest was made without probable cause, was therefore illegal, 
and the evidence obtained pursuant to a search incident to 
that arrest should have been suppressed prior to trial. In 
short, his suppression argument is based solely on the alleged 
illegality of the arrest. 
Appellant correctly notes that the Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted the Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), 
standard concerning what constitutes probable cause for arrest 
without a warrant. State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 103 
(1980); See also: State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 
1259 (1972). In Whittenback, this Court affirmed the Beck 
standard as follows: 
-9-
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The determination should be made on an 
objective standara: whether from the 
facts known to the officer and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in 
believing that the suspect had committed 
the offense. 
621 P.2d at 106, citing State v. Hatcher, supra. As also 
noted by appellant, this same basic standard is reflected in 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2 (1980). Subsection (3) of that 
section provides that a peace officer may make an arrest 
without a warrant: 
When he has reasonable cause to 
believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) Flee or conceal himself to avoid 
arrest; 
(b) Destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) Injure another person or damage 
property belonging to another person. 
In State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972), 
this Court interpreted the language of subsection (3) as 
follows: 
In performing his duties as 
authorized by this statute, a police 
officer is not required to meet anv such 
standard of perfection as to demand an 
absolutely certain judgment before he may 
act. The test to be applied is one which 
is reasonable and practical under the 
circumstances: whether a reasonable and 
prudent man in his position would be 
-10-
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justified in believing facts which would 
warrant making the arrest. In ruling on 
the anmissibility of eviaence so obtained, 
the questions as to the validity of the 
arrest and the justification for anv 
search made in connection therewith~are 
primarily for the trial court to 
determine; and on appeal we respect that 
prerogative and do not upset his 
determination unless it clearly appears 
that he was in error. 
499 P.2d at 278 (footnote omitted); cited in State v. Elliott, 
Utah, 626 P.2d 423, 427 (1981).4 
Officer Alexander sighted and later engaged 
appellant in the immediate vicinity of the "marijuana 
compound" in Red Butte Canyon--an extremely rugged area posted 
no trespassing, containing no trails designated for public 
use, having but one access road with three locked gates (the 
first of which displayed no-trespassing signs), and where 
people were not commonly seen. Before arresting appellant, 
Officer Alexander had been advised by Gene Lowin, a U.S.F.S. 
employee who had knowledge of and responsibilities concerning 
the canyon, that appellant was trespassing (as noted in the 
statement of facts, he may also have asked appellant for 
identification and an explanation of appellant's presence in 
the area). Given the totality of the facts known to Alexander 
4At the time of the Eastmond decision, the 
provisions of § 77-7-2 were contained in § 77-13-3. 
-11-
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and the inferences he might fairly have drawn therefrom (i.e., 
that appellant most probably had seen the no-trespassing signs 
conspicuously posted at the entrance to the area's only access 
road or had encountered the locked gates along that road, and 
therefore knew that his entry and presence was unlawful; that 
appellant was not a deer hunter who had permission to be in 
the area (in that it was not yet hunting season); and that 
appellant did not otherwise have permission to be in the area 
based on the information received from the U.S.F.S. employee 
who was present at the scene of appellant's apprehension), 
under the standards set forth in State v. Whittenback, supra, 
and State v. Eastmond, supra, he had probable cause to arrest 
appellant for criminal trespass as it is defined in Utah Code 
Ann.,§ 76-6-206(2}(b), which provides that a person is guilty 
of criminal trespass under circumstances not amounting to 
burglary when: 
Knowing his entrv or presence is unlawful, 
he enters or remains on property as to 
which notice against entering is given by: 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely 
to come to the attention of intruders. 
Hence, appellant's arrest was legal and the evidence obtained 
pursuant to a search incident to that arrest was properly 
admitted at trial. 
-12-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL 
TRESPASS. 
Appellant argues that although he failed to comply 
with Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by not objecting 
at trial to the jury instruction he now challenges on appeal, 
this Court, nevertheless, should consider his assignment of 
error under Utah Code Ann., § 77-35-19(c) (1980). In State v. 
Kazda, Utah, 545 P.2d 190 (1976), this Court explained the 
purpose and meaning of Rule Sl's requirement that "[n]o party 
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto": 
There is an important purpose to be served 
by the rule requiring that objections be 
made to the instructions. It gives an 
opportunity for the court to correct, or 
to fill in any inadequacy in the 
instructions, so that the jury may 
consider the case on a proper basis. In 
order to accomplish that purpose, the rule 
should be adhered to. Accordingly, the 
standard rule is that when a party faITs 
to make a proper objection to an erroneous 
instruction, or to present to the court a 
proper request to supply any claimed 
deficiency in the instructions, he is 
thereafter precluded from contending 
error. 
Id. at 192, 193 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See 
also: State v. Valdez, Utah, 604 P.2d 472 (1979); State v. 
Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978); State v. Erickson, Utah, 
-13-
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568 P.2d 750 (1977). Because appellant, by his own admission, 
failed to object to the jury instruction in the trial court, 
he should be precluded from doing so here. 
However, even if this Court is inclined to consider 
appellant's assignment of error in order to avoid manifest 
injustice under § 77-35-19(c) {1980), there was simply no 
error concerning the instructions given; and thus, as was the 
case in State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 {1982) {cited by 
appellant), appellant makes no showing of injustice. See 
also: Kazda, supra; State v. Schoenfeld, Utah, 545 P.2d 193 
{1976). 
Appellant contends that it would be manifestly 
unjust to sustain his conviction based on what he alleges was 
a "poorly drafted information whose language was erroneously 
duplicated in the trial court's instructions to the jury" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 9). He claims Instruction No. 12 
erroneously combined the elements of burglary and criminal 
trespass, failing to include the full requirements of either. 
That instruction read in part: 
Before you can convict the defendant 
of the crime of Criminal Trespass, Count 
II, you must find from the evidence, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 21st day of 
August, 1980, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the defendant, Charles Kermit 
Lesley, unlawfully entered the property of 
the U.S. Government. 
-14-
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R. 60). 
2. That at the time of said entrv the 
defendant, Charles Kermit Lesley,-intenaea 
to commit the crime of Production Of A 
Controlled Substance. 
According to appellant, Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-
206(2) (a) (ii) (1953), as amended, requires that the accused 
must intend to commit a crime that is not a felony in order to 
be guilty of criminal trespass; and because felonious intent 
is an element of burglary but not of criminal trespass, to 
instruct the jury that it must find that appellant intended to 
commit the crime of production of a controlled substance (a 
felony) frustrates the intent of the criminal trespass 
statute. Appellant even goes so far as to suggest that the 
state should have charged him with burglary and not criminal 
trespass. These arguments result from a combination of clever 
manipulation of the language contained in the criminal 
trespass statute and a misreading of the burglary statute. 
Utah's burglary statute, Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202 
(1953), as amended, reads in part: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit a felony or theft or commit an 
assault on any person (emphasis added). 
Section 7 6- 6- 20 6 ( 2) (a) (ii), the port ion of Utah's criminal 
trespass statute at issue here, reads: 
A person is guilty of criminal trespass 
if, under circumstances not amounting to 
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burglary as defined in sections 76-6-202, 
76-6-203, or 76-6-204 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other 
than theft or a felony. 
First, because appellant did not enter or remain 
unlawfully in a building or a portion thereof (under the 
definition of "building" in Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-201(1) 
(1953), as amended), he clearly could not have been charged 
with burglary. Therefore, appellant's suggestion concerning a 
charge of burglary is entirely without merit. 
Second, appellant's interpretation of § 76-6-206(2) 
(a)(ii) would lead to a rather illogical result: An 
individual who entered or remained unlawfully on property, 
other than a building, and who intended to commit "any crime, 
other than theft or a felony," would be guilty of criminal 
trespass; yet an individual under the same circumstances who 
intended to commit a felony would be guilty of no crime. The 
Legislature could not have intended such a result. The words 
"other than theft or a felony" simply are mitigating with 
respect to burglary in that if a person enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building and intends to commit a crime other 
than theft or a felony, that person is guilty only of criminal 
trespass. Those words are not exclusive with respect to 
criminal trespass, and cannot reasonably be read to render 
appellant immune from prose~ution under§ 76-6-206(2)(a)(ii). 
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In the construction of a statute, the Court must be 
controlled by the evident purpose of the Legislature to attain 
a certain ena. State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955 
(1933). In short, the fundamental question which transcends 
all others is what was the intent of the Legislature. Johnson 
v. Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 37, 411 P.2d 831 {1966). 
Insuring proper effect to legislative intent and purpose is a 
primary consideration. Parson Asphalt Production, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, Utah, 617 P.2d 397 (1980); Millett 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., Utah, 609 P.2d 934 (1980). A statute 
should not be construed or applied so as to produce 
incongruous results which were never intended. Snyder v. 
Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964). Accordingly, 
§ 76-6-206(2)(a)(ii) is most reasonably construed as applying 
to appellant, who unlawfully entered the property of the 
United States Government with the intent to commit a felony. 
The trial court's Instruction No. 12 was therefore correctly 
given. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED. 
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court 
abused its discretion in not dismissing a juror who apparently 
was having some difficulty staying awake during the first day 
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of appellant's trial; and that this denied him the right to a 
fair trial. Both of the cases cited by appellant in support 
of his position, United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333 (3rd 
Cir. 1972); and People v. Dupont, New York, 444 N.Y.S.2d 40 
(1981), indicate that the disqualified jurors therein were 
grossly inattentive (e.g., the juror in Cameron had been 
asleep at least 50 percent of the time during trial). 
Appellant has not shown that this was the situation here. He 
merely quotes a brief exchange between the trial judge and Mr. 
Kilpack, the juror, which indicates the judge's concern about 
Kilpack's ability to remain awake (T. 101). Concern for a 
sleepy juror was not indicated by any of the parties at any 
other time during the trial. It should also be noted that the 
trial court decided to recess for the day when it became aware 
of Mr. Kilpack's difficulty--a reasonable, discretionary 
response to the problem, which quite obviously protected 
appellant's right to a fair trial. 
In State v. Pace, Utah, 527 P.2d 658 (1974), this 
Court addressed a similar claim that the trial court erred in 
not declaring a mistrial because of inattentiveness or 
drowsiness of jurors. Justice Henriod, writing for a 
unanimous Court, said: 
Two onlookers said two of the jurors 
consciously went to sleep. The trial 
judge, not charged with somnambulism, in 
denying the motion for mistrial, said that 
-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he had observea the whole jury; that one 
had not gone to sleep, and the other <lid 
"doze-for a second, twice" but had aroused 
before he, (the judge) "had a chance to 
call it to her, (the juror's) attention." 
Hence there seems to have been nothing in 
the eyes of the beholder, nor in the arms 
of Morpheus reflecting that the juror 
could have been ensconced, so as to have 
stupefied the veniremen, or the sound 
discretion of the trial judge. 
527 P.2d at 659 (footnotes omitted). 
The trial judge in appellant's case was in a favored 
position for observation of the juror, Mr. Kilpack; and the 
exercise of his discretionary judgment denying appellant's 
motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed on appeal, just 
as this Court did not disturb the trial judge's discretion in 
State v. Pace, supra. See also: People v. Hanes, Colo. App. 
596 P.2d 395 (1978), affirmed, 598 P.2d 131 (1979), citing 
State v. Pace, supra. In short, appellant has made no showing 
that the trial court's action denied him the right to a fair 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, respondent 
respectfully submits that the trial court's judgment and 
sentence respecting both the charge of production of a 
controlled substance and the charge of criminal trespass 
should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 24th day of January, 
1983. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Ronald J. 
Yengich, Attorney for Appellant, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84111, this 24th day of January, 1983. 
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